

Society for the Advancement of Philosophy
University of Zagreb – Center for Croatian Studies

INTERNATIONAL PHILOSOPHICAL SYMPOSIUM

Metaphysics, Language, and Morality

PROGRAM & BOOK OF ABSTRACTS

December 1–3, 2010

Borongaj Campus • Center for Croatian Studies
Borongajska cesta 83d, 1st floor • Zagreb • Croatia
<http://www.hrstud.hr/upf>



Contents

- 5** Welcome Address
- 7** Symposium Program
- 13** Abstracts
- 35** Organizing Committee
- 37** Our Previous Conferences
- 39** Prolegomena – Journal of Philosophy



Welcome Address

On behalf of the Society for the Advancement of Philosophy and the Center for Croatian Studies of the University of Zagreb, we would like to extend a warm welcome to all of you participating in symposium “Metaphysics, Language, and Morality”. We are happy to announce that nearly thirty papers will be presented at the conference, by philosophers from countries as diverse as Australia, Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, India, Iran, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, United Kingdom, United States and Croatia. It is safe to say that the international character of this conference is obvious. What will also become obvious, as we are more than sure, is the good quality of the papers we are about to hear over the next three days. As for the organizing institutions of the symposium, Center for Croatian Studies (with the Philosophy Department as one among its eight departments) was founded in 1992, whereas Society for the Advancement of Philosophy was founded in 2002, with the particular aim of promoting good philosophical work and scholarly cooperation not only in Croatia, but also at the international level. This is why, in addition to the philosophical importance of the papers to be presented and subsequent discussions of them, one of the main objectives of this conference is to foster communication among scholars from different countries with similar theoretical interests and approaches to doing philosophy. We are sure that this year’s conference will be a significant step towards that goal.

Members of the Organizing Committee



Conference Program



Wednesday, 1 December 2010

- 10:00–10:30 Opening of the Symposium
ZVONIMIR ČULJAK, *Head of the Center for Croatian Studies*
JOSIP TALANGA, *President of the Society for the Advancement of Philosophy*
- 10:30–11:00 **MÁRTA UJVÁRI**, *Corvinus University of Budapest, Hungary*
Kinds and Continuants With Modal Features
- 11:00–11:30 **GORAN ŠVOB**, *University of Zagreb, Croatia*
Moore's Proof of an External World
- 11:30–12:00 *Coffee Break*
- 12:00–12:30 **TADEUSZ CIECIERSKI**, *University of Warsaw, Poland*
Demonstrating Procedures and Demonstrata
- 12:30–13:00 **BORUT CERKOVNIK**, *University of Ljubljana, Slovenia*
Language of Empirical Experience
- 13:00–13:30 **DUŠAN DOŽUDIĆ**, *University of Zagreb, Croatia*
Names, Descriptions, Predicates
- 13:30–15:00 *Lunch Break*
- 15:00–15:30 **JURAJ HVORECKÝ**, *Czech Academy of Sciences*
Embodiment and Emotions
- 15:30–16:00 **TOMISLAV JANOVIĆ**, *University of Zagreb, Croatia*
The Concept of Person and the Normativist Fallacy
- 16:00–16:30 **PIOTR MAKOWSKI**, *Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznan, Poland*
A Question of Ontology in Ethics
- 16:30–17:00 *Coffee Break*
- 17:00–17:30 **DIANA POPESCU**, *Haarlem, Netherlands*
Moore's Paradox and Non-Cognitivism: A Defense
- 17:30–18:00 **DINA BABUSHKINA**, *University of Helsinki & University of Tampere, Finland*
Desire and Moral Motivation
- 18:00–18:30 **SANNA HIRVONEN**, *University College London, UK*
Perspective Dependence

Thursday, 2 December 2010

- 10:00–10:30 **GERALD VISION**, *Temple University, USA*
Conscious Properties and Their Realizers
- 10:30–11:00 **MONICA JITAREANU**, *Central European University, Budapest, Hungary*
Phenomenalism Reconsidered
- 11:00–11:30 **FRITZ J. McDONALD**, *Oakland University, Rochester, USA*
Metaphysical Minimalism
- 11:30–12:00 *Coffee Break*
- 12:00–12:30 **OLGA RAMIREZ CALLE**, *Saint Louis University, Madrid, Spain*
A Three Fold Model of Conceptual Application: The Case of Ethics
- 12:30–13:00 **RANJAN K. PANDA**, *Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay, India*
Language and Morality: A Searlean Thesis on Communicative Ethics
- 13:00–13:30 **ARTO LAITINEN**, *University of Helsinki, Finland*
Searle on Metaphysics, Language and Morality
- 13:30–15:00 *Lunch Break*
- 15:00–15:30 **DAVOR PEĆNJAK**, *Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb*
Free Will, Compatibilism, Incompatibilism, and Chaos Theory
- 15:30–16:00 **ANDREA BORGHINI**, *College of the Holy Cross, Worcester, USA*
GIORGIO LANDO, *Scuola Normale Superiore, Pisa, Italy*
Lewis on Fundamentality and Composition
- 16:00–16:30 **MLADEN DOMAZET**, *Institute for Social Research – Zagreb, Croatia*
It's That Unstable Thing Over There: The Law-Constitutive
Understanding of Quantum Objects
- 16:30–17:00 *Coffee Break*
- 17:00–17:30 **MARIÁN ZOUHAR**, *Slovak Academy of Sciences, Bratislava, Slovakia*
Are There Directly Referring Non-Rigid Designators?
- 17:30–18:00 **GIUSEPPE CASCIONE**, *University of Bari, Italy*
Philosophy of Language Between Description and *Erlebnis*.
The Case of Colors

Friday, 3 December 2010

- 10:00–10:30 **LUIS FERNÁNDEZ MORENO**, *Complutense University of Madrid, Spain*
A Version of Descriptivism on Substance Terms
- 10:30–11:00 **MARCO ANNONI**, *University of Milan, Italy*
Words, Concepts and Scientific Practices: A Biosemiotic Perspective
- 11:00–11:30 **MOHAMMAD SAEEDIMEHR**, *Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran*
Necessity and Apriority: An Examination of the Equivalency Thesis
- 11:30–12:00 *Coffee Break*
- 12:00–12:30 **TOMISLAV BRACANOVIĆ**, *University of Zagreb, Croatia*
Morality as a Biological Trait
- 12:30–13:00 **OLGA MARKIČ**, *University of Ljubljana, Slovenia*
Ethics: A Neurophilosophical Framework
- 13:00–13:30 **LUCA MALATESTI**, *University of Rijeka, Croatia*
JOHN McMILLAN, *Flinders University, Adelaide, Australia*
Psychopathy at the Intefrace between Philosophy and Psychiatry
- 13:30–15:00 *Lunch Break*
- 15:00–15:30 **NENAD SMOKROVIĆ**, *University of Rijeka, Croatia*
Logical Consequence and Rationality
- 15:30–16:00 **JOSIP VRBAN**, *Donji Miholjac, Croatia*
Different Notions of Logical Consequence
- 16:00–16:30 Closing of the Symposium
20:00 Farewell Banquet



Abstracts



Words, Concepts and Scientific Practices: A Biosemiotic Perspective

MARCO ANNONI

University of Milan
Via Miola 22, Saronno (Va) 21047, Italy
annoni.mar@gmail.com

Scientific terms like “matter”, “ADDH”, “truth”, etc. are anything but neutral vehicles of meanings. Instead, as any other means of symbolic communication, they actively determine the ways in which we can think, interpret and perceive reality and ourselves. Accordingly, philosophers and scientists have long recognized that the manipulation of symbols requires both rational and ethical control, especially in those practices in which a reference to an objective and public reality is at stake. Building on the semiotic theory elaborated by the American scientist, logician and philosopher Charles S. Peirce in my communication I will address two issues concerning the meanings of scientific technical terms. First, I will argue that, like biological entities, symbolic systems can be thought as complex self-replicating and adapting communities of organisms that parasite our brains, cultures and epistemological practices. Linguistic and conceptual symbols emerged and co-evolved with us and therefore they are now jointly responsible for the way in which we tend to perceive, represent and structure our cognitive experience. Second, I will show how Peirce’s semiotic pragmatism, once it is understood as a theorem of formal semiotics, represents a powerful tool to clarify and develop the logical meaning of any meaningful symbol in a rational and controlled way.

Desire and Moral Motivation

DINA BABUSHKINA

University of Helsinki, Department of Political and Economic Studies
University of Tampere, Graduate School for Philosophy
PL 24 (Unioninkatu 40 A), 00014 University of Helsinki
dibishe@gmail.com

In my report I would like to concentrate on one of the crucial discussions in present day’s meta-ethics, namely the nature of desire. In his book *Moral Vision* David McNaughton raises this question in connection to the problem of moral motivation. Explaining the issue between cognitivists and non-cognitivists, McNaughton formulates the key question: “Can an action be explained by appeal to a cognitive state alone or must the explanation always include a non-cognitive element, a desire?” (1988, 106). The discussion concentrates on the account of desire: if desire should be seen as a cognitive or as a non-cognitive state. In case desire is a non-cognitive state, an expla-

nation is needed of what kind of non-cognitive state the desire is and what role it plays in the explanation of our motivation. In case desire is a cognitive state, then the question is whether the belief alone is enough to account for moral motivation. Focusing on the abovementioned questions, I will review the arguments for and against desire as a non-cognitive state (McNaughton, 1988; Smith, 2000). I will show that we cannot exclude desire from the explanation of our motivation for actions. Arguing against the cognitivists' account of desire (McNaughton, 1988, 110–113), I will show that their requirement of the “insight into why being in the desired state should bring satisfaction” (1988, 111) cannot be considered as a valid argument against the belief-desire theory.

Lewis on Fundamentality and Composition

ANDREA BORGHINI

College of the Holy Cross
1 College Street, Worcester, MA 01610, USA
aborghin@holycross.edu

GIORGIO LANDO

Scuola Normale Superiore
Piazza dei Cavalieri 7, Pisa 56126, Italy
giorgio.lando@sns.it

David Lewis's metaphysics is committed to the claim that some properties are natural. The claim serves three chief purposes: (i) it provides a grounding for the definition of intrinsic properties, thereby securing (ii) Lewis's version of the Principle of Recombination (roughly: “Anything can coexist with anything”) and (iii) the identification of the basis for so-called Humean Supervenience (in its most general version: “Any contingent truth is made true by the pattern of instantiation of fundamental properties and relations,” where “fundamental” is roughly equivalent to “natural”). As Schaffer (2004) argues, however, there really are two conceptions of natural properties within Lewis's metaphysics: the fundamentalist conception, according to which the bearers of sparse properties are all and only the elementary particles of microphysics; the scientific conception, according to which sparse properties are instantiated by entities of any kind of complexity. In this paper, we confront both conceptions with Lewis' own peculiar theses about mereology and composition, recombination, and supervenience. In particular, we review the impact on the identification of the bearers of natural properties of three main tenets of Lewis' mereology (namely: the admittance of gunk as a genuine possibility; composition as identity in its weak form; unrestricted composition). We contend that, under both conceptions of natural properties, Lewis's views on naturalness, mereology, recombination, and supervenience may not be compatible; hence, the ‘official’ Lewisian metaphysics cannot be the one we are usually offered.

Morality as a Biological Trait

TOMISLAV BRACANOVIĆ

University of Zagreb
Center for Croatian Studies – Department of Philosophy
Borongaj Campus, Borongajska 83d, 10000 Zagreb, Croatia
tomislav.bracanovic@hrstud.hr

Evolutionary explanations of morality usually run into two classes of objections. According to the first class of objections, attempts to explain morality in biological terms are unfounded because morality is obviously not a biological trait and as such does not lend itself to evolutionary explanations. According to the second class of objections, morality is a biological trait, but only in a trivial and scientifically uninteresting sense of the word. The central objective of the paper is to show that both classes of objections are wrong. In the first part of the paper it is shown that morality satisfies some of the most central criteria for biological traits (like species typicality, developmental stability, non-malleability and genetic background). In the second part of the paper it is argued that biological status of morality can be traced by focusing on design constraints it shares with various forms of altruism in other species.

A Three Fold Model of Conceptual Application: The Case of Ethics

OLGA RAMIREZ CALLE

Saint Louis University
Campus Madrid, Alberto Alcocer 47, 11c, Madrid
olgaramirezcalle@gmail.com

The paper proposes an alternative model to realist and non-cognitive explanations of the rule-guided use of thick ethical concepts and examines the implications that may be drawn from this and similar cases for our general understanding of rule-following and the relation between criteria of application and correctness. It addresses McDowell's non-cognitivism critique and challenges his defence of the entanglement thesis for thick ethical concepts. Contrary to non-cognitivists, however, I propose to view the relation between the two terms of the entanglement as resulting from the satisfaction of a previously applied moral function. This is what I call a 'Three-Fold Model'.

Philosophy of Language between Description and *Erlebnis*. The Case of Colors.

GIUSEPPE CASCIONE

University of Bari
Corso Italia 23, 70123 Bari, Italy
g.cascione@scienzepolitiche.uniba.it

There is in Wittgenstein's philosophy a sort of "Phenomenology of colors". In *Philosophische Bemerkungen* he says that all bidimensional systems are useless in representing the spatial relationship (the "between") and the internal statute of colors. To describe the particular type of description, which is a chromatic system, Wittgenstein applies a formula that contains both the natural element of the visual impression and the element of sign, that always implicates an activity of interpretation. In *Bemerkungen über die Philosophie und die Psychologie*, he furnishes a classification of what he calls "Bereich des Erlebnis", and proceeds to give us a schematic division of a kind of theory of sensations, based on three elements: experiences, emotions and convictions. According to him, the problem of the communication of particular types of sensations (pain, virtual sensations, sadness) has no easy solution. In language-games we must deal with the subjectivity of feelings as well as the impossibility of verification as regards the interchangeability of these experiences.

Language of Empirical Experience

BORUT CERKOVNIK

University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Arts – Department of Philosophy
Aškerčeva 2, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia
borut.cerkovnik@guest.arnes.si

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate some problems associated with nonconceptualist criticism (mostly from Tye, Peacock and Heck) of McDowell's conceptual account of experience. The criticism is focused on McDowell's account of minimal shades of color and his use of the concept that shade. Concerning first, my suggestion is that if we have recognitional concepts of, say, ordinary colors as red, green, blue, yellow etc., we can have recognitional concepts of special shades of color (e.g. red₂₇ and red₅₈) also. It is not necessary to comprise a color scale 'in the head' to have recognitional capacity of different colors. In fact, printers and printer's devils use color samples of immense shades of colors and they don't have them 'in the head'. Would we say of them that they have not conceptual experiences of all

that colors? Obviously not? Otherwise we must conclude that we have conceptual content of lengths only if we have a good ‘Augenmaß’. Concerning second, I think that explicit usage of the concept that shade is not necessary in the learning, say, colors red₂₇, red₅₈ etc. It suffices implicit concept of that shade, which could be learnt analogous learning of the ordinary concept of color, when we, say, learn a child with words “Bring me that red ball”, “Pick up the green circle”, “Sky is ...?” etc. Printers and their devils don’t need the concept that shade; even they have a good ‘Augenmaß’ for all that shades/colors.

Demonstrating Procedures and Demonstrata

TADEUSZ CIECIERSKI

University of Warsaw, Institute of Philosophy
Krakowskie Przemieście 3, 00–927, Warsaw, Poland
taci@uw.edu.pl

In *Demonstratives* David Kaplan proposed an intriguing hypothesis concerning demonstrations (gestures or complex actions accompanying uses of demonstratives): they could be conceived as non-linguistic signs (or at least a partial signs) and described as bearers of semantical properties (or at least a bearers of counterparts of semantical properties). The resulting theory is the so-called Fregean Theory of Demonstrations (FTD) which contrasts with essentially non-Fregean theory of demonstratives. The main difference is that demonstratives obey the principle of direct reference while the analogue of this principle does not hold for demonstrations which can, in opposite to demonstratives, designate distinct individuals in different circumstances of evaluation. Although the topic of FTD was put into the shade by subsequent discussions concerning relations between demonstrations and directing intentions, I believe that FTD, as well as the general idea of regarding demonstrations as signs, deserves serious theoretical attention. In my talk I would like to discuss both the general idea and the FTD. First of all, I would like to propose a typology of demonstrating procedures based on the distinction between various types of attention directing strategies that could be exploited by the speaker. Second of all, I would like to consider the question about the applicability of FDT to all types of (previously distinguished) demonstrating procedures. Among other things, I will raise some doubts concerning the universal character of FDT. Finally, the question concerning the impact of the theory of demonstrations on the theory of demonstratives will briefly be discussed.

It's That Unstable Thing Over There: The Law-Constitutive Understanding of Quantum Objects

MLADEN DOMAZET

Institute for Social Research – Zagreb
Amruševa 11/II, HR-10000 Zagreb
domazet@idi.hr

What becomes of our clearest theories of explanation, when faced with the unpalatable quantum phenomena that seem to demand abandonment of metaphysical commitment to self-standing material objects? The general explanatory theory advocates unification of explanatory concepts with everyday discourse, identification of essentially similar characteristics in direct experience and the hypothesised explanatory ontology and conceptualisation of phenomena in terms of objects enduring causally regulated change. On the other hand quantum theory feeds anti-realist suspicions about the worth of realist explanatory endeavour with examples of phenomena in which the structure of material separation and individuation based on spatial extension is insufficient for construction of deeper explanatory narratives. Example from history of science, that of Newton's law-constitutive definition of objects in response to Descartes problem of bodies is used to suggest a possible strategy for explanations unifying the quantum and common-sense conceptual domains, provided the anti-realist challenge to such enterprise is read as questioning the epistemological justification of interpretation of experience in both cases.

Names, Descriptions, Predicates

DUŠAN DOŽUDIĆ

University of Zagreb
Center for Croatian Studies – Department of Philosophy
Borongaj Campus, Borongajska 83d, 10000 Zagreb, Croatia
ddozudic@hrstud.hr

According to the received view of proper names, names are referential expressions on a par with logical constants. According to the received view of definite descriptions, descriptions are denoting expressions or, more precisely, complex quantified expressions implying existence and uniqueness. Less commonly and more controversially, it is sometimes argued that descriptions can function as referential expressions. Contrary to the received view of proper names, there is a theory originating in Russell's and Quine's writings, made more explicit by Tyler Burge ("Reference and Proper Names"), according to which proper names should not be treated as

constants, but as predicates. Contrary to both quantificational and referential treatment of descriptions, Delia Graff Fara (“Descriptions as Predicates”) proposed a theory according to which descriptions should always be treated as predicates. Thus we get two predicative views of expressions which are usually and intuitively not perceived as predicates. In my paper I will discuss a possibility of combining these two predicative views in a unified predicative theory and point out to some consequences of such a move.

Perspective Dependence

SANNA HIRVONEN

University College London
31 C Grand Parade, N4 1LG London, UK
sanna.hirvonen.09@ucl.ac.uk

Recently many philosophers and linguists (e.g. Kölbel 2002, Recanati 2007, Richard 2008) have argued that the point of view or *perspective* an agent occupies influences the truth conditions of expressions like predicates of personal taste, epistemic modals or gradable adjectives. Perspective dependence goes beyond ordinary context dependence in that conversational partners typically share a context but not a perspective. Intuitively perspectives can be understood as mental states of an agent at a time, including propositional and conative attitudes, perceptions, memories, and so on. A concrete example of the kind of puzzles perspective dependence creates is the behavior of predicates of taste. On the one hand we feel that the truth of judgments of taste depends on how things taste to us which is why taste predicates are thought to be perspective-dependent. But on the other hand we disagree about taste which shows that taste predicates are not purely subjective, as e.g. the verb *to like*. This clash of intuitions has led to problems in giving the semantics of perspective dependence, and motivated novel approaches such as semantic relativism (e.g. Egan et al. 2005, Lasersohn 2005, MacFarlane 2005). This paper evaluates the arguments that have been given in favour of some groups of expressions being perspective dependence and offers philosophical and linguistic criteria to identify genuinely perspective-dependent expressions. Having established perspective dependence as a subspecies of context dependence I discuss the kind of challenges an adequate semantic theory for it must face.

Embodiment and Emotions

JURAJ HVORECKÝ

Philosophy Institute, Czech Academy of Sciences
Jilská 1, 110 00 Prague 1, Czech Republic
juraj@hvorecky.com

When Prinz (2004) put forward his theory of emotions, the field of emotion research was shaken by clear signs of excitement. His attempt to bridge a gap between cognitive and perceptual theories seemed very promising. His illustrations of possible mechanism by which perceptions of bodily changes can represent concerns external to the body were quite ingenious. While there was a variety of criticism offered, Prinz's theory so far proved successful in withholding many sophisticated attacks. While some attempts to disprove it turned on an assumption that it proves too little (not all emotions can be explained by the suggested mechanism, i.e. Morton (2002)), we will try to demonstrate that it might prove too much. Drawing on Darwin's work on expression of emotions, we will put forward possible counterexamples of mental states that fit Prinz's account, but do not intuitively belong into the emotion category. Not only these states comply with the requirement for embodied appraisals, which serve as fundamentals to his theory, but they also fulfill the valence criterion that is supposed to account for further intuitions about emotion categorization. If correct, our criticism either forces Prinz to rethink the extent of emotion categories or make adjustment to his account. We will conclude by making some general remarks on the role of embodiment in mental states and how it can elucidate a demarcation between emotions and other mental states.

The Concept of Person and the Normativist Fallacy

TOMISLAV JANOVIĆ

University of Zagreb
Center for Croatian Studies – Department of Philosophy
Borongaj Campus, Borongajska 83d, 10000 Zagreb, Croatia
tjanovic@inet.hr

One of the longest-lasting debates in social ontology and the ontology of ethics, with allegedly grave consequences for the booming field of bioethics, is the debate over the criteria of personhood. Although typically seen as central and foundational for bioethics, the concept of person has proven hopelessly vague and intangible, resisting a clear-cut definition in terms of necessary and/or sufficient conditions. For some authors, this is an unmistakable sign of its non-empirical, metaphysical foundation. For others, it is a consequence of the concept's intuitive, folk-psychological

origin, explainable by conditions of our evolutionary past – conditions selectively favoring representational systems that classify objects into “persons” and “non-persons”. Now these two interpretations needn’t be seen as mutually exclusive. Indeed, there is ever more evidence that they should be treated as complementary since the philosophical concept of personhood functions as a kind of theoretical proxy of our genetically preprogrammed, automatically executable classificatory practice. This view is backed up by recent findings in the fields of evolutionary psychology and cognitive neuroscience – findings that have led to a postulation of a specialized mechanism in our brain called “person representation network” or the “social brain”. (Farah & Heberlein). The interesting thing about the person recognition mechanism (PRM) is that it is not an exclusively cognitive device. By classifying stimuli as persons the mechanism simultaneously produces implicit “value judgments”, i.e., represents person-like objects as possessing a kind of “moral status”. This insight could be relevant for the personhood debate for the following reason: it is perhaps no surprise that past attempts did not yield a theoretically satisfying concept of person since the criteria specifying such an entity *cannot* be objectively founded, i.e., independently of the normative import of representations generated by PRM. If this is so, then a kind of “normativist fallacy” seems to be at work whenever we make allegedly factual judgments (e.g. in our folk-psychological behavior explanations) about objects represented as “persons”. I intend to examine the plausibility of this assumption and its possible consequences.

Phenomenalism Reconsidered

MONICA JITAREANU

Central European University
Nádor u. 9, 1051 Budapest, Hungary
jitareanu@ceu.hu

The paper is an exploration of the metaphysical merits of phenomenalism, which is the view that material objects are theoretical constructions of sense-data. Phenomenalism is less known today, but it used to be a very influential theory. A radical form of empiricism, phenomenalism is the thesis that the basic metaphysical “bricks” of the world are sense-data, or sensory qualities (redness, loudness, hardness, etc.). Metaphysically speaking, phenomenalism is a form of the bundle-theory: at the most basic level, there are only attributes. Yet it is sometimes argued that phenomenalism should be distinguished from the bundle theory for the following reason: according to the “classical” bundle-theory (as developed by Hume), to say that a certain object (say, a tomato) exists is to say that certain sensory qualities are being experienced (redness, roundness, softness, etc.), and that when the experience ceases to exist, the experienced qualities cease to exist too. By contrast, phenomenalism is

the claim that material objects are logical constructions of sensory qualities, which is a commitment to the existence of unsensed sense-data: what is needed to talk about the existence of material objects is just the possibility of the experience, not its actual existence. To say that a red tomato exists on the table is to say that certain sense-data (redness, roundness, softness, etc.) would be experienced if a subject had a certain experience. Phenomenalism is not fashionable nowadays; it is considered that its faults outnumber its virtues. This paper is an analysis of the merits of phenomenalism and argues that it still holds very interesting theoretical promises.

Searle on Metaphysics, Language and Morality

ARTO LAITINEN

University of Helsinki, Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies
PL 4, 00014 University of Helsinki
arto.laitinen@helsinki.fi

According to Searle, “deontology” comes with institutional reality. The key to institutional reality is collective acceptance or recognition of status functions and constitutive rules, which shares the logical structure of declarations (e.g. I pronounce you husband and wife). A key assumption about that structure is that it has two directions of fit: like beliefs and assertions, declarations claim that something is the case, and like orders, directives, desires and intentions, declarations are in the business of making something the case. Like declarations, collective acceptance or recognition has the structure of “making something the case by taking it to be the case”. The result of collective acceptance of status functions is that desire-independent reasons for action are created. All this is meant to work in this limits of Searle’s “one world metaphysics” – electrons and elections are in the same reality, as a protons and presidents. One problem for Searle is that there are always already desire-independent reasons for action, even in pre-institutional contexts. They include moral reasons. Searle agrees that moral obligations and deontology linked with them need not be created institutionally, but most of the time Searle talks as if institutional deontology is all there is: he even proposes a test for institutionality in terms of whether something involves deontology. And he says in the context of universal human rights, that he has never heard of universal human obligations (as if Kant never wrote a word!). So the problem for Searle then is whether morality and desire-independent normativity are institutionally created or not. If not, do they figure in his accepted metaphysics of electrons and protons? (A related problem for Searle is that language-use like promising is for Searle deontology-creating). Another problem concerns the very idea that something could have two directions of fit. I will argue that even if “we make something the case by representing it as being the case”, these representations

do not have two directions of fit. A further problem concerns the identification of the representation in question in collective cases. It does not seem that in all cases there is such a representation. Rather there are normatively regulated actions which create institutional facts – perhaps further collective acceptance is an enabling condition, but assuming that collective recognition on its own directly creates the institutional reality bypasses the role of real acts, even acts of declaration (as pointed out in the critical review in *Notre Dame Review of Books* by Tsohatzidis). In this paper I will argue for a slightly different account of morality, language, metaphysics and institutional reality, which starts from moral (normative) realism, and sees the institution-creating acts normatively embedded from the get go. These normatively-embedded acts have a relevance that means that collective acceptance is merely an enabling feature. And even if it would be a central feature, it would be misleading to claim that collective acceptance has two directions of fit.

A Question of Ontology in Ethics

PIOTR MAKOWSKI

Adam Mickiewicz University, Institute of Philosophy
Ul. Szamarzewskiego 89C, 60–569 Poznan, Poland
makowski@amu.edu.pl

There is quite a common opinion in current metaethical discourse that ethics has its metaphysics or ontology. To receive satisfying answer to the question as ‘Do our ethical propositions refer to some realm of entities?’, one needs to know how to understand ontology and in which way we are justified to put forth our ontological claims. A critical account of ontology is not possible without acceptable epistemological theory. Contemporary theory of cognition is to a large extent influenced by naturalized epistemology (Quine). What is interesting, naturalized epistemology from the beginning was simultaneously supported by Quineian view on ontology. For Quine, ontology was a kind of explanatory, useful and economic follow-up of epistemic practices. The connection of naturalistic epistemology with ontology *à la* Quine is also a strategy used in metaethics, when speaking of ethical properties. This combination makes ethics strongly *realistic* and *essentialistic*. I defend the view that both these two aspects are unacceptable. The ontology of properties in ethics occurs to be... supernaturalistic, against the intentions of theoreticians’ approaches based on the ideas of naturalized epistemology. Nonetheless, we can still defend the view of ethics in ‘soft’ realistic, pragmatic terms. This strategy debunks the strong ontological ‘luggage’ of ethics as a product of our subjectivity. What is interesting, this aspect of philosophical enquiry refers to the idea of another understanding of ontology, developed by Heidegger. In the end, I try to show how ethically important it can be (also signaling the possibility of its naturalistic account).

Psychopathy at the Interface between Philosophy and Psychiatry

LUCA MALATESTI

University of Rijeka, Department of Philosophy
Omladinska 14, 51000 Rijeka, Croatia
lmalatesti@ffri.hr

JOHN McMILLAN

Flinders University, Adelaide, Australia

We think that investigating the moral responsibility of psychopaths is relevant for policy making and judiciary practice about psychopathic offenders. In addition, we think that the recent theoretical and empirical research that is based upon Robert Hare's psychopathy checklist is relevant for this investigation. We have supported our first claim in Malatesti L. and McMillan J. eds. *Responsibility and Psychopathy*. Oxford: OUP, 2010. Here we clarify and defend our second commitment. This defence involves a brief illustration of some of the functional impairments that correlate with psychopathy as measured by Hare's checklist. Such correlations have attracted the attention of philosophers interested on psychopathy. Moreover, we will illustrate in broad lines the current theoretical hypotheses about the neurological causes of the disorder. We will also consider some related philosophical issues concerning the psychiatric classification of antisocial personality disorders.

Ethics: A Neurophilosophical Framework

OLGA MARKIČ

University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Arts – Department of Philosophy
Aškerčeva 2, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia
olga.markic@guest.arnes.si

Recent developments in neuroscience raise the worry that understanding how brains cause behavior will radically change our understanding of the mind and will consequently have a huge impact on our views about ethics. The worry many cognitive scientist express is the following: if decisions, choices and actions were to be revealed as results of neural mechanisms, they could not be seen as free anymore and would not support moral responsibility. I will argue that neither dualistic humanistic image presupposing libertarian free will nor scientific scientific image of the mind where our behavior is caused by forces that bypass our conscious mental life (eliminativism and ephiphenomenalism) is a viable option for naturalist. I will suggest a neurophilosophical framework that will provide both: a more detailed

knowledge about how control and volition are processed in the brain, and understanding how these notions are connected to our subjective feeling of freedom and responsibility.

Metaphysical Minimalism

FRITZ J. McDONALD

Oakland University, Philosophy
340 O'Dowd Hall, Rochester, MI 48309-4401, USA
mcdonal4@oakland.edu

Properties and facts play a central role within metaphysics, yet there is no widely accepted account of what constitutes a property or a fact. Traditional conceptions of these metaphysical notions raise serious philosophical puzzles, making the existence of each seem dubious. Drawing on the minimalist theory of truth, I argue in favor of a minimalist conception of properties and facts. A minimalist theory of properties and facts explains these matters in terms of the acceptance of trivial schemas. To make the case that minimalism is a superior approach to properties and facts, I argue against the standard views in the philosophical literature. I argue that the minimalist approach to properties has advantages over realism, nominalism, and the trope theory. I argue that the minimalist approach to facts is superior to the standard treatment of facts on correspondence theories. Metaphysical minimalism, a minimalist metaphysics of properties and facts, is a distinct and superior alternative to the theories of properties and facts currently on offer.

A Version of Descriptivism on Substance Terms

LUIS FERNÁNDEZ MORENO

Complutense University of Madrid
Faculty of Philosophy, Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science
28040 Madrid, Spain
luis.fernandez@filos.ucm.es

This paper aims to propose a version of the description theory of reference – for short, descriptivism – on terms for chemical substances, for short, substance terms, which proves to be immune to the main objections from the causal theory's advocates, and especially from Kripke. This version is grounded on some proposals of descriptivists such as Searle and Strawson about proper names, which will be

extended to substance terms. According to Searle and Strawson the reference of a proper name is determined by a sufficient number of identifying descriptions that speakers associate with the name, but these authors admit different sorts of such descriptions, and among them descriptions in which the average speaker defers the reference of a term to other speakers. In this regard descriptivism can accept Putnam's thesis of the division of linguistic labour and claim that some of the descriptions associated by non-experts have the function of deferring the reference of substance terms to their reference in the use by experts. Thus descriptivism can maintain that the referent of a substance term, such as it is used by experts and hence also by the rest of the members of our linguistic community, is determined by a sufficient number of the descriptions that (present) experts concerning a substance associate with the term. I will argue that this version of descriptivism, which grants more weight to social links than to historical links, can explain better than Kripke's theory the reference of the use of substance terms by the average speaker.

Language and Morality: A Searlean Thesis on Communicative Ethics

RANJAN K. PANDA

Indian Institute of Technology Bombay, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences
Powai, Mumbai – 400076 India
ranjan.panda@iitb.ac.in

John Searle tries to resolve the metaphysical gap between is and ought by introducing the thesis that evaluative statements can be derived from the descriptive statements. The content of the evaluative statements is construed by intentionality. For Searle, intentionality is not necessarily linguistic rather various forms of intentionality can be realized within an intentional communicative framework of language – is a social institution. And, the institutional activities are governed by norms or rules – the constitutive rules. Thus, values belong to the realm of institutional facts are disclosed by communicative intentionality. In this paper, I would critique Searle's thesis from three points of views. Firstly, the prelinguistic form of intentionality that refers to the background ultimately shows that the ontology of intentionality per se is a brute fact. Secondly, the semantic content of an expression as an irreducible phenomenon shows that the meaning could be denaturalized. Thirdly, if institutional facts are grounded in collective intentionality then it is not merely primitive, rather it is normative. The normativity of communicative intentionality must therefore involve cooperative commitment and correlative obligation.

Free Will, Compatibilism, Incompatibilism, and Chaos Theory

DAVOR PEĆNJAK

Institute of Philosophy
Ulica grada Vukovara 54, 10000 Zagreb, Croatia
davor@ifzg.hr

In this presentation I will discuss some points which connect elements of chaos theory and the problem of free will. Chaos theory is deterministic theory so I think that it is not usable for libertarianism. I would like to show that compatibilism regarding free will and determinism which uses convergence/divergence dynamics and the notion of teleological guidance control and system is also not viable. I would like to show that there is no principled difference between manipulation and natural determinism in the sense that initial states and events together uniquely determine any future action of an agent. I will conclude that only options are either libertarianism or hard determinism but that libertarianism could be compatible with the scientific worldview.

Moore's Paradox and Non-Cognitivism: A Defense

DIANA POPESCU

MA student Philosophy of the Social Sciences, MSc student Political Science
Bakenesserstraat 27 H, 2011 JJ, Haarlem, Netherlands
diana_elena_popescu@yahoo.com

My aim in this paper is to defend moral non-cognitivism against R. Joyce's criticism as presented in his book *The Evolution of Morality* by arguing against his use of Moore-type phenomena ("p and I don't believe that p"). Joyce's argument is that the non-cognitivist interpretation of moral judgments, according to which the latter are merely expressions of the speaker's feelings, is wrong because it does not stand the test posed by Moore's paradox. To be able to pass it, Joyce claims, non-cognitivists would have to accept that moral judgments express beliefs, which would defeat their thesis that moral judgements are mere ways of 'evincing our feelings' (Ayer 2004, p. 111). In my paper, I show that Joyce's argument fails to prove that non-cognitivists have to admit the existence of a belief component in moral judgments. The reason is that Joyce does not draw the right conclusion from Moore's paradox: while he sees it as evidence that the first sentence of the paradox contains the mental attitude whose lack is reported in the second sentence, I argue that the correct interpretation is that the first sentence of the paradox is the object of the mental attitude whose lack is reported in the second sentence. I will conclude by presenting

the consequences that my criticism has for the rest of Joyce's project, which are significant since he uses his rejection of non-cognitivism as a premise in arguments directed against meta-ethical theories arguing for the vindication of morality.

Necessity and Apriority: An Examination of the Equivalency Thesis

MOHAMMAD SAEEDIMEHR

Tarbiat Modares University
Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Humanities
P.O. Box: 14115-139, Tehran, Iran
saeedi@modares.ac.ir / saeedimehr@yahoo.com

Since Kant's introduction of the concept of *a priori* knowledge, it has been a prominent and widely accepted equivalency thesis (ET) according to which all necessary truths are *a priori* (and *vice versa*) and all contingent truths are *a posteriori* (and *vice versa*). Some philosophers, however, have recently challenged this thesis. In this paper, after dividing the recent approaches to (ET) into definitional and intuitional ones, I discuss the former approach in which one presents at first a definition of *a priori* knowledge and then, on the basis of the explicit or implicit implications of that definition, one can confirm or reject (ET). After making some primary points I examine some of proposed definitions of "apriority" and their impacts on (ET). These definitions are accurately analysed in respect to the tripartite definition of knowledge, i.e. true justified belief and it is shown that how some of them results in denial of (ET) and others do not. Eventually, I argue that, whatever definition we adopt for apriority, there will be some contingent propositions which could be known a priori.

Logical Consequence and Rationality

NENAD SMOKROVIĆ

University of Rijeka, Department of Philosophy
Omladinska 14, 51000 Rijeka, Croatia
nenad@ffri.hr

The paper scrutinizes the relationship between theoretical articulations (proof-theoretic and model-theoretic) of logical consequence and pre-theoretic or ordinary concept of logical consequence. Arguing that there are instantiations of such a concept in ordinary reasoning, the paper tackles empirical, cognitive-theoretic studies that support this hypothesis.

Moore's Proof of an External World

GORAN ŠVOB

University of Zagreb
Faculty of Arts – Department of Philosophy
Ivana Lučića 3, 10000 Zagreb, Croatia
gsvob@ffzg.hr

There has, notoriously, been some disagreement about the real sense and relevance of Moore's famous 'two hands argument' against scepticism. In his 1939 article, Moore presented the argument as responding to some Kant's dilemmas. Yet, two other traditional philosophers seem to be particularly important in this context: Descartes and Berkeley. Neither of them was a genuine sceptic, but both of them had their particular interests in questions linked with scepticism concerning the 'things outside us'. As for the very phrase, it is far from superfluous to ask, once again, what is meant in this context by 'outside' and by 'us'. Though they themselves were not quite clear about it, both Descartes and Berkeley seem, in this respect, at least, to be much clearer than Kant. One must notice the radical difference between the hypothetical sceptic who endorses a (methodological) solipsism and asks the question: 'how can I be certain of reality of external things, (including other people)', and the bastard semi-scepticism which asks 'how can *we* be sure of existence of things *outside us*'. But, what is the sense in having serious doubts about the existence of external objects and not having any doubts about the existence of other people including philosophers with whom one considers the question and to whom the proof is actually directed? There is some special kind of oddity or incoherence in the picture of individual humans, seriously discussing existence of things 'outside them'. Such incoherent pictures and situations are not quite rare in philosophy. Moore's proof also generates such an incoherent situation and one has to ask: has Moore really demonstrated anything? And could he? After all, if somebody different from Moore seriously doubted the existence of external things, Moore's existence would not be exempted from this doubt. It is quite strange to expect any kind of serious proof (or anything else for that matter) from somebody whose very existence is open to doubt. Raising his two hands, Moore allegedly convinced himself that at least two material objects exist. Still, to convince a sceptic, would raising one's own hands be enough? Or would punching sceptic's nose be more adequate?

Kinds and Continuants with Modal Features

MÁRTA UJVÁRI

Corvinus University of Budapest
Közraktár u. 4–6, 1093 Budapest, Hungary
marta.ujvari@uni-corvinus.hu

Kinds and their continuant tokens enjoy distinguished roles in ontological structuring and in the articulation of our epistemic claims. Recently, eliminativist metaphysicians have explored various arguments, including those about over-determination, colocation and ontological parsimony, for dispensing with kinds and continuants. In this talk I'll show, first, that none of these arguments are decisive against the disputed entities. Second, I'll argue that sortal/modal properties yielding the persistence conditions of continuants are not unreal and extrinsic, leading to anti-realism. On the contrary, they are real and extrinsic, for modal conceptualism on their status should not be conflated with a cheap version of semanticism. To accomplish this task, I'll see what it involves to be 'extrinsic', 'relational'; how Carnap should be vindicated on frameworks; and I'll appeal to the analogy of the modal case with the temporal case. My approach is based on closing the gap between the metaphysical and the epistemic perspectives.

Conscious Properties and Their Realizers

GERALD VISION

Temple University
748 Anderson Hall, Philadelphia, PA 19122, USA
gvision@temple.edu

The most popular view of dispositional properties is (a) that they are modal, and (b) that they are analysable in terms of the categorical states of their possessors. In some instances (b) has been defended as a necessary condition for realism concerning dispositional properties. Because the persistence conditions of particulars are summaries of dispositional features, describing in a loose way what a particular thing can and cannot survive, it has been held that such substances and their matter – say, a statue and its marble – are not ontologically separate entities. I argue that the analysis in terms of categorical properties, (b) above, must be false. If the situation were otherwise, what happens at a microscopic level could not be responsible for what happens at a macroscopic level. My particular interest is in showing that the same distinguishability thesis is alive for ontological distinctions between mental properties and their material realizations.

Different Notions of Logical Consequence

JOSIP VRBAN

Harambašićeva 99, 31540 Donji Miholjac, Croatia
josip@vrban.org

Central topic of philosophical logic is reasoning, or inference, what are conclusions that can be drawn from a set of premises. In other words, the central topic of philosophical logic is logical consequence. Stewart Shapiro in the 21st chapter of *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic* lists several different notions of logical consequence: (a) modal notion (A is logical consequence of set Γ , if it is not possible for members of set Γ to be true and A false), (b) possible worlds (A is logical consequence of set Γ , if A is true in every possible world where every member of set Γ is true), (c) semantic notion (A is a logical consequence of G if the truth of the members of G guarantee the truth of A in virtue of the meanings of the expressions of those sentences), (d) rational notion (A is a logical consequence of G if it is irrational to maintain that every member of G is true and that A is false), (d) deductive notion (A is a logical consequence of G if there is a deduction of A from G by a chain of legitimate, gap-free (self-evident) rules of inference). In this paper we will show different notions of logical consequence, try to decide which notion describes our problems, are all notions acceptable or we should try to get only one universal notion of logical consequence.

Are There Directly Referring Non-Rigid Designators?

MARIÁN ZOUHAR

Slovak Academy of Sciences, Institute of Philosophy
Klemensova 19, 813 64 Bratislava, Slovakia
marian.zouhar@gmail.com

The paper shows that directly referring terms (DRTs) have to be rigid designators. Since DRTs refer to something on the basis of linguistic conventions alone and since these linguistic conventions are independent of possible worlds (i.e., they hold in all worlds that can be described by a given language), there cannot exist a DRT with shifting reference across possible worlds. Although this claim seems to be indubitable and widely recognized, it was questioned recently. Drawing on Lewis' ontology of counterparts, G. Martí has shown that a DRT is capable to refer to different individuals in different possible worlds. A DRT designating an individual in our world is supposed to designate the individual's counterparts in other possible world. Now the paper tries to show (i) that the counterpart theory is com-

patible with the idea that DRTs are rigid designators, (ii) that the DRTs assumed by Martí's argument do not, in fact, refer directly, and (iii) that no term is both directly referring and non-rigid.

Organizing Committee

President

DUŠAN DOŽUDIĆ

University of Zagreb Center for Croatian Studies – Department of Philosophy
ddozudic@hrstud.hr

Secretary

KAROLINA KUDLEK

Society for the Advancement of Philosophy, Zagreb
casopisni.ured@hrstud.hr

TOMISLAV BRACANOVIĆ

University of Zagreb, Center for Croatian Studies – Department of Philosophy
tomislav.bracanovic@hrstud.hr

ZVONIMIR ČULJAK

University of Zagreb, Center for Croatian Studies – Department of Philosophy
zculjak@hrstud.hr

TOMISLAV JANOVIĆ

University of Zagreb, Center for Croatian Studies – Department of Philosophy
tjanovic@inet.hr

LOVORKA MAĐAREVIĆ

University of Zagreb, Center for Croatian Studies – Department of Philosophy
lmadjarevic@hrstud.hr

DRAGANA SEKULIĆ

University of Zagreb, Center for Croatian Studies – Department of Philosophy
d.sekulic1@vip.hr

JOSIP TALANGA

University of Zagreb, Center for Croatian Studies – Department of Philosophy
josiptalanga@yahoo.com



Our Previous Conferences

- 2010 *International Workshop on Aristotle's De Caelo, Book I* (Zadar, Croatia)
- 2009 *David Hume in Historical and Contemporary Context* (Zagreb, Croatia)
- 2008 *Perspectives on Russell* (Zagreb, Croatia)
- 2008 *Philosophy and Religion* (Zagreb, Croatia)
- 2007 *Descartes and Contemporary Philosophy* (Samobor, Croatia)
- 2006 *John Stuart Mill and his Philosophical Legacy* (Samobor, Croatia)
- 2005 *Freedom and Equality in Contemporary Philosophy* (Samobor, Croatia)
- 2004 *Belief, Justification and Knowledge* (Zagreb, Croatia)
- 2003 *Plato on Goodness and Justice* (Zagreb, Croatia)
- 2003 *Schelling's Philosophy of Mythology* (Zagreb, Croatia)
- 2002 *Contemplating Art* (Varaždin, Croatia)



Prolegomena
Journal of Philosophy



Participants of the conference are invited to submit full-length versions of their papers for publication in the peer-reviewed and open-access journal *Prolegomena*, published both in print and online by the Society for the Advancement of Philosophy and the University of Zagreb – Center for Croatian Studies. *Prolegomena* publishes articles in all areas of contemporary philosophy, as well as articles on the history of philosophy, particularly those which aim to combine a historical approach with current philosophical trends. Special emphasis is placed on the exchange of ideas between philosophers of different theoretical backgrounds and on interdisciplinary research into the relationship between philosophy and the social and natural sciences. *Prolegomena* is published biannually in English, German or Croatian. It is indexed and abstracted in *Arts & Humanities Citation Index*, *Current Contents / Arts & Humanities*, *Dietrich's Index Philosophicus*, *Humanities International Index*, *International Bibliography of Book Reviews of Scholarly Literature in the Humanities and Social Sciences*, *International Bibliography of Periodical Literature in the Humanities and Social Sciences*, *Philosopher's Index* and *Scopus*.

Prolegomena Online

<http://hrcak.srce.hr/prolegomena>

PUBLISHERS

University of Zagreb – Center for Croatian Studies
Society for the Advancement of Philosophy

EDITORS

Karolina Kudlek
Tomislav Bracanović

Typeset by Ocean graf (Zagreb, Croatia)

Printed in 200 copies by Top Dan (Samobor, Croatia)

A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the National and University
Library in Zagreb under 748667.

ISBN 978-953-6682-94-2

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or distributed in any
form or by any means, or stored in a database or retrieval system, without the prior
written permission of the authors.