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# **Zagreb Applied Ethics Conference 2019**

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## **ABSTRACTS**

*Venue:* Klovićevi dvori Gallery  
Jezuitski trg 4 · Zagreb · Croatia

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## KEYNOTE LECTURE

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### **The life you don't have to save**

**DAVID BENATAR**

*University of Cape Town*

Much of this presentation will be devoted to evaluating Peter Singer's argument that affluent individuals owe a great deal to the world's absolute poor. I shall argue first that one of his premises is much more controversial than it first appears, and that a less controversial version of that premise would generate a less demanding conclusion. I shall then argue that even if we accept his premises, we should reach a less demanding conclusion than he does. I shall argue next that even if one rejects the previous argument, we are not obliged to give away, during our lives, as much as he thinks, although we would then be required to give posthumously. Finally, I shall consider a different kind of argument for contributing towards the world's poor – one based on a principle of restitution (and most famously advanced by Thomas Pogge). I shall argue that while it avoids one problem with Peter Singer's argument, it also leads to a conclusion that is less demanding of individual affluent people.

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## CONTRIBUTED PAPERS

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### **In praise of forbearance in the public sphere**

**PIA ANTOLIC-PIPER & MARK PIPER**

*James Madison University*

Much of the discussion surrounding freedom of speech relates to the importance of *promoting* speech: on this approach, the more speech the better, both for individuals and for democratic society. There is obvious merit to this line of thought. Yet rampant, unrestrained speech also poses perils to individuals and society: more speech does not necessarily contribute to general and democratic welfare. With this in mind, we propose to examine the merits and advantages of *forbearance* in public speech. We argue that, within appropriate constraints, forbearance is an extremely important civic virtue. Crucially, we should not be understood as claiming that forbearance is always called for; without question, there are many situations that demand abandoning forbearance in favor of unrestrained expression. We propose to defend this claim on grounds of the contribution of forbearance to personal and societal flourishing. To be clear, our argument provides *ethical* reasons to engage in forbearance only. We do not espouse governmental enforcement of citizens' forbearance. On the contrary, while a democratic government should promote freedom of speech, it is in citizens' interest to exercise forbearance as a civic virtue. Free speech must be protected, of course, but it is incumbent upon us to use our free speech rights prudently and virtuously. If this line of thought has merit, then it has obvious implications for applied ethics, especially in relation to how citizens should engage with each other within the public sphere.

## **The paradox of self-fulfillment in romantic love**

**AARON BEN-ZE'EV**

*University of Haifa*

Romantic love expresses the authentic personal concern of the lovers. This concern is different, however, from egoism. I have substantiated this claim by indicating that the essence of romantic love consists of caring and sharing, which are the opposite of egoism. The introduction of self-fulfillment into marriage is compatible with these considerations, as self-fulfillment is essential for bringing out the best in each partner, and hence supporting enduring, profound love.

## **Would it be responsible to attribute responsibility to autonomous machines?**

**LÁSZLÓ BERNÁTH**

*Hungarian Academy of Sciences & Eötvös Loránd University*

The aim of the paper is to argue that even though a growing number of philosophers (Dennett, Floridi & Sanders 2004, Sullins 2006) claim that we should regard autonomous non-sentient machines as morally responsible agents, it is unmotivated to attribute moral responsibility to them. The problem is twofold. On the one hand, if we accept a deontic concept of moral responsibility that defines morally responsible being as someone who is in principle an appropriate target of blame, guilt, or other reactive attitudes (Pereboom 2001, Smith 2008), it seems to be completely pointless to attribute moral responsibility to non-sentient machines. On the other hand, insofar as one embraces a theory of responsibility which is best motivated by consequentialism, it will be unmotivated to attribute responsibility to autonomous machines because holding them responsible would probably lead to negative outcomes. This is because holding them responsible would diminish how much extent the society regards the producers of autonomous machines as being morally responsible for the accidents caused by the machines. Thus, this practice would result in more accidents because the producers had less interests in producing safer machines. Therefore, even those who embrace a theory of moral responsibility that has consequentialist background (and Dennett's, Sullins', and Floridi's & Sander's interpretationist approaches are such theories) should arrive to the conclusion that it is not a good idea to attribute moral responsibility to non-sentient autonomous machines after all.

## **Are psychopaths harmed by their condition?**

**MIA BITURAJAC**

*University of Rijeka*

While the issue of harmfulness of psychopaths to the rest of society has been relatively well explored (Hare, 1998; Davis-Barron, 1995; Kiehl & Hoffman, 2011) the question of whether psychopathy is harmful for psychopaths themselves has not received much attention. The issue, however, is worth addressing because settling it could have considerable theoretical and practical consequences. In fact, it could guide us in formulating and normatively justifying the types of appropriate intervention concerning those individuals. Specifically, in the context of the debate of psychopaths' mental illness status, the harm requirement is a central component of both normativist and hybrid naturalist views on mental illness (Jurjako,

2019; Malatesti, 2014; Nadelhoffer & Sinnott-Armstrong, 2013). The main thesis of this paper is that on the grounds of an account of harm, one closely tied to a conception of well-being, psychopathy is a harmful condition. I will proceed as follows. First, I will argue that we can elaborate a notion of harm that could be useful in the debate on psychopathy by relying on an account of well-being, while also considering the available clinical descriptions and empirical data concerning the condition of psychopathy. Important components of this account are some notions that have been elaborated within the discussion of well-being and disability (Campbell & Stramondo, 2017). The notion of harm will be investigated through the prism of the value fulfillment theory of well-being proposed by Valerie Tiberius (Tiberius, 2018). This is a subjective theory that has values and their fulfillment, together with the regulative ideal of appropriate values, as its key components.

## **Against ethics settings of autonomous vehicles**

**TOMISLAV BRACANOVIĆ**  
*Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb*

It is generally agreed that autonomous vehicles (AVs) will improve road traffic safety and, consequently, save human lives. A number of AVs, it is also generally agreed, is bound to encounter so-called dilemmatic situations of having to choose between two evils, e.g. sacrificing one life in order to save several others. For this reason, there is an ongoing debate about the ethics settings for AVs: the way AVs should be programmed to behave in dilemmatic situations and, no less important, who should decide how they should be programmed. This problem will be formulated as a trilemma between (a) AVs with personal ethics settings, (b) AVs with mandatory ethics settings and (c) AVs with no ethics settings. It will be argued that, when it comes to the number of lives to be saved, all three options are likely to outperform conventional vehicles and (b) is likely to outperform (a) and (c). Nevertheless, it will be also argued that (a) and (b) should be rejected due to their unacceptable – both utilitarian and deontological – moral implications and that (c) is the only plausible option.

## **Genetic enhancement, fair cooperation and social justice**

**IVAN CEROVAC**  
*University of Rijeka*

Genetic enhancement represents an improvement of human abilities and talents, giving those who are thus enhanced a competitive advantage over others. If genetic enhancement technologies are privately funded and only a small group of wealthy people has access to them, their competitive advantage might be further increased, and the existing social, economic and political inequalities might be increased as well. I discuss Baccarini's (2015) regulation proposal according to which genetic enhancement can remain privately funded and (at least for some time) accessible only to a small group of people, provided that the benefits of their enhancement (e.g. increased productivity, better health care) are distributed in accordance with the lax difference principle (i.e. to the greatest reasonable advantage of the worst-off citizens). I have some doubts regarding this proposal. Namely, I argue that there are other more important principles (i.e. the principle of equal liberty and the principle of fair equality of opportunity) that have lexical priority over the difference principle, and offer several arguments supporting this claim. In the rest of the paper I argue that privately funded genetic enhancement, available only to a small number of wealthy citizens, can lead to the violation of both the principle of equal liberty and the principle of fair equality of

opportunity. It should therefore be replaced with publicly funded genetic enhancement available to all citizens.

## **Self-interest and intergenerational justice**

**VANGELIS CHIOTIS**

*Glasgow Caledonian University*

Rationality-based theories of justice commonly exclude non-contributors. However, it can be shown that rational agents have self-interested reasons to consider future generations and the unborn. Justice as mutual advantage is a special case in theories of justice that relies on individual rationality. It commonly excludes future generations since it is based on mutuality, which excludes non-contributors. Moral contractarianism, a theoretical and analytical tool that examines moral responsibility and desert, offers an argument for intergenerational justice: the idea that each generation has moral obligations to the next and moral requirements from the previous. The current argument starts from the idea that individuals are rational and participate in social contracts that regulate moral behaviour to further their interests through mutually advantageous interactions. Agents within a social contract maximise by participating in as many mutually advantageous interactions as possible. The existence of a social contract implies that interactions take place within a social framework, where contributors and non-contributors are known. Information about past behaviour is widely available and is used in rational deliberation and selection of interlocutors. A second implication of the social contract is that agents interact repeatedly within a social context that includes a given set of interlocutors - a set social group. Thus, the social contract is a mechanism that performs three functions: Distributes information, establishes the repetitiveness of interactions and regulates the requirements of justice. Given the above, agents have rational reasons to promote their reputation as means to attract potential interlocutors. The importance of reputation makes it rational for agents to participate in interactions with non-contributors to promote their reputation and ensure that they participate in as many interactions as possible. Therefore, it is rational for one to participate in interactions that are not mutually beneficial, in order to maximise the number of mutually beneficial potential interactions, and thus, maximise her utility overall.

## **Sources of unethical behavior in corporate environments**

**CHRYSOULA GITSOULIS**

*College of Staten Island, City University of New York*

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is a movement – an approach to business practices – aimed at encouraging companies to be more aware of the impact of their business on the rest of society, including their own stakeholders and the environment. Proponents of CSR view corporations as intimately integrated with the rest of society; they recognize that their activities are not self-contained, like a private poker party, but instead have profound ramifications on our lives. As a result, they insist that corporations should consider the interests of all the groups they have an impact on -- consumers, employees, shareholders, and the community at large -- in their decision-making practices. Yet, corporations often fail to do this, and indeed, behave in ways that are morally reprehensible. In what follows, I will amplify on six causes of unethical behavior in corporate environments. The list is not meant to be exhaustive, but merely to draw our attention to problems that need to be rectified, for it is only when we recognize the causes of bad behavior that we are in a position to improve upon it. The causes I will consider, and amplify on during the course of my paper, are the

following: (1) Lack of government oversight; (2) Failure to institutionalize ethics; (3) Shortsightedness; (4) Groupthink; (5) Corporate pressures; and (6) Diffusion of responsibility. This paper seeks not only to identify the primary causes of unethical behavior, but also suggests means of rectifying them.

## **Insanity defence without insanity**

**MARKO JURJAKO<sup>1</sup>, LUCA MALATESTI<sup>2</sup>, AND GERBEN MEYNEN<sup>3</sup>**

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The insanity defence is intensely debated. On one side, it is considered an expression underlying the practical motivations (Robinson, 1998) and the moral integrity (Meynen 2016) of the criminal law. On the other side, the very existence and the specific components of this defence have been criticised (Meynen, 2016). A recent legal ethical debate has focused on the issue whether the mental illness clause should be included in the formulation of the insanity defence (Slobogin, 2015). Several formulations of the legal criteria for the insanity defence contain, in fact, two elements (Simon & Ahn-Redding, 2006). One is the presence of certain incapacities when committing the act. Let us call it the incapacity clause. The other is the mental illness clause that requires that these exculpatory incapacities are due to a mental illness (or disorder or disease). In this paper we offer a balanced argument to motivate (re-)thinking about the mental illness clause in the insanity defence. We maintain that we should not take for granted that the insanity defence includes an illness clause. Depending on other safeguards in a legal system, we argue that a balanced decision should be made to either include or exclude the clause. However, our main line of argument is that any attempt at removing this clause from legal formulations of insanity defences should offer alternative ways to preserve some advantages that we think follow from including the mental illness clause. We offer three principal arguments to highlight these advantages.

## **Miserable, meaningless lives and unwelcome deaths**

**FRIDERIK KLAMPFER**

*University of Maribor*

David Benatar has been championing the cause of an overall badness of human lives since the turn of the century, most forcefully in his 2008 academic bestseller *Better Never To Have Been*. In his most recent book, *The Human Predicament*, he added some extra layers of dark paint to his sinister portrait of human destiny by arguing that our lives are not just miserable, but also insignificant, i.e. devoid of any meaning and purpose. And yet, just like in *Better Never To Have Been*, he has once again shunned from making what appears to be the next logical step from such an insight, namely that a quick death would be a relief and a blessing for each and every one of us. Still, if human life is not only of poor quality, but also mostly meaningless, how come death is not (more) welcoming? In the paper I take up this challenge and investigate whether Benatar's particular blend of anti-natalism (or, more precisely, existential pessimism) and (cosmic) nihilism can offer a plausible solution to it.

## Vices of virtue-based research ethics

DIJANA MAGDINSKI

*Bielefeld University*

Responsible conduct of research (RCR) is mostly framed in deontological and consequentialist terms, emphasizing the rule- or principle-based guidelines and promoting well-being. For example, researchers should avoid the FFP (fabrication, falsification, plagiarism) practices and they should consider the consequences of their research. In recent years, a virtue-based approach to research ethics has been suggested as a promising alternative or complement (e. g., Macfarlane, 2009; Pennock, 2018). In a nutshell, instead of focusing on a regulatory framework, emphasis should be put on the cultivation of virtues which are characteristic of a good researcher. However, although I consider it to be appealing, I believe this approach is not feasible in the contemporary research environment, characterized by harsh competition for limited resources. I will argue that questionable research practices will persist as long as there are incentives that favor them. In order to promote individual research integrity, one needs to create an environment which promotes RCR, through institutional change of incentives and principles which ensure fair competition.

Macfarlane, Bruce (2009), *Researching with integrity: the ethics of academic inquiry*, New York: Routledge; Pennock, Robert T. (2018), "Beyond research ethics. How scientific virtues theory reframes and extends responsible conduct of research", in Carr, David (ed.), *Cultivating Moral Character and Virtue in Professional Practices*, New York: Routledge, 166-177.

## Does the procreation asymmetry imply antinatalism?

ADRIANO MANNINO

*University of Bern*

According to the normative procreation asymmetry, the fact that a person's life would be (sufficiently) miserable constitutes a strong moral reason not to bring them into existence, whereas the fact that a person's life would be (sufficiently) happy constitutes no or at most a weak reason to bring them into existence (cf. Narveson 1967, McMahan 1981). David Benatar has presented a defense of the asymmetry and argued that it implies antinatalism, i.e. a duty to abstain from having children (Benatar 1997, 2015). This claim has been challenged by Johann Frick, who accepts the asymmetry but argues that while there is a *pro tanto* reason to avoid having children, it is not the case that we ought, all things considered, to remain childless (Frick 2014). Frick argues that the desire to procreate is legitimate if the risk of creating a miserable life is sufficiently small, paralleling the permissibility of risk imposition in cases like everyday car driving. I argue that while Frick's considerations are *pro tanto* sound, his conclusions are hasty. A plausible account of our judgments regarding risk imposition must invoke a significant consequentialist *pro tanto* reason, which may justify car driving (in virtue of its life-saving ripple effects) but not procreation. However, a consequentialist *pro tanto* reason may yield other considerations dampening antinatalism after all: Rather than focusing on personally avoiding the creation of a very small number of lives, we should perhaps focus on preventing the existence of large numbers of the most miserable human and non-human lives.

Benatar, D. (1997). Why it is Better Never to Come Into Existence. *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 34 (3); Benatar, D., Wasserman, D. (2015). *Debating Procreation: Is It Wrong to Reproduce?* New York: Oxford University Press; Frick, J. (2014). *Making People Happy, Not Making Happy People': A Defense of the Asymmetry Intuition in Population Ethics*. Doctoral dissertation, Harvard University; McMahan, J. (1981). Problems of Population Theory. *Ethics*, 92 (1); Narveson, J. (1967). Utilitarianism and New Generations. *Mind*, 76 (301).

## **The social responsibility of firms: the case of effective altruism**

**ANDRÁS MIKLÓS**  
*University of Rochester*

The Effective Altruism (EA) movement prompts individuals to use their time, money, skills, and other resources to do the most good they can. This paper examines whether firms and their managers should follow the formula EA recommends for individuals - even when doing so reduces profitability. It argues that, although the impact of EA could be increased by using firms as vehicles for altruism, corporate altruism should ultimately be rejected. EA so far has restricted its focus to private decisions about career choice and charitable giving. It could have much greater impact, however, by making recommendations to managers and board members about how to act within their corporate roles, and by advising investors on how to invest, so as to do the most good they can. Effective altruists should prefer corporate altruism over private charitable contributions due to the cost advantages of firms with special competencies, resources, and complementarities. Furthermore, the consequentialism of EA better fits corporate altruism than it does private decisions since firms, lacking personal lives, can use their resources to do the most good without compromising family relationships, friendships, and projects central to individuals' sense of who they are. Although EA could have greater impact if it extended its focus from individual philanthropy to corporations, this paper argues that corporate altruism should be rejected. Giving managers a mandate to maximize firms' net social impact undermines managerial accountability and exacerbates corporate governance problems since unresolved disagreements about priority-setting make both defining managerial objectives and performance evaluation more contentious.

## **Is abortion healthcare?**

**CALUM MILLER**  
*University of Oxford*

In this paper I propose that there is no positive right to abortion on the grounds that it is healthcare. I begin by outlining the policy implications of such a right, including rights of funding, access, diminished grounds for conscientious objection, and possible duties to fund abortions overseas. I will firstly outline the burden of such policies and suggest that they are significantly weighty such that we need a proper justification for them. I then note evidence against the suggestion that abortion is healthcare. This includes evidence of opinion polls of laypeople and medical professionals. While there are no polls directly asking whether abortion is healthcare, there are a number of plausible indices of what people consider healthcare, and the attitudes of laypeople and medical professionals do not match what we would expect if abortion were intuitively a part of healthcare. Next, I suggest that the most promising accounts of healthcare do not yield the conclusion that abortion is healthcare in any sense that plausibly generates a positive right to abortion. While, on a very broad conception of healthcare, abortion might be considered healthcare, it is clear that healthcare broadly conceived does not automatically generate positive rights. I discuss 3 of the most promising suggestions for why abortion might be healthcare, arguing that none of these yield a good case for a positive right. I conclude by revisiting the implications of abortion's being healthcare, arguing that, given the failure of such a case, certain current and proposed governmental policies lack justification.

## **Interpretive injustice in psychiatry**

**ALEX JAMES MILLER TATE**

*University of Birmingham*

In this paper, I argue that the pervasive influence of a biomedical, reductionist view of mental illness, at least as presently understood, inflicts a systematic interpretive injustice (Fricker 2007) upon many mental health service users. There are two main upshots to the analysis of the phenomenon I provide here. The first is philosophical; the canonical concept of systematic interpretive injustice is unsuited to shedding light on the injustice experienced by service users. I put forward a conceptual revision that resolves this difficulty. The second is ethical; the dominance of the biomedical model in contemporary Psychiatry turns out to be a pressing ethical concern for the psychiatric profession, as well as an epistemic one. I thus suggest that mental health professionals have a strong ethical reason to reject many commonly accepted corollaries of the biomedical model of Psychiatry in both theory and practice.

## **Saving lives, averting lives, and population size**

**MICHAEL PLANT**

*University of Oxford*

Many people accept the ‘Intuitive View’, that saving lives is good and—as the Earth is overpopulated—that averting new lives is good too. Given the evident tension within the Intuitive View, I investigate how probable it is and what the practical implications would be if it were true. I do this first assuming Totalism and second assuming a Person-Affecting View. I argue that the Intuitive View is unlikely on Totalism: it is more probable that one of saving lives or averting lives is bad. Further, were the Intuitive View true, the value of each of saving and averting lives would be small—far smaller than we would expect—and thus both relatively unpromising interventions if the aim is to do the most good. This raises problems for Peter Singer’s position: he holds the Intuitive View, Totalism, and that life-saving and life-averting charities are among the most-effective giving opportunities. On a Person-Affecting view, by contrast, the Intuitive View is far more likely. If it were true the values of saving and averting lives would be in such a large range that, absent further information about how overpopulated the world is, we would be able to say little about the value of either. The more general implication of the argument is that we don’t know the values of saving or averting lives unless we know under- or overpopulated the world is. I close by briefly arguing that it’s not obvious where the world is in relation to optimum population size on either the Totalism or Person-Affecting View.

## **The ethics of discussing population size in the context of environmental policy**

**DOMINIC ROSER**

*University of Fribourg*

Should we affect the number of children in order to achieve environmental goals? This paper argues that we should refrain from talking about this question in the first place. Two observations are at the center of this paper. First, the debate on population has often been associated with racist or sexist attitudes, misanthropy, insensitivity towards the involuntarily

childless, and burdensome pressure on potential future parents – to name just a few. Some of these problems are avoidable but others are fairly unavoidable features of talking about population issues. Second, there is little value-added in discussing population. Population, after all, is only a minor part of the overall solution to environmental problems and, to the extent that it is part of the solution, population goals can be achieved, at least partially, as a side-effect of pursuing non-environmental – and independently valuable – goals, such as gender equality and economic justice. Combining the two observations, it seems like there are many risks and few benefits in raising the topic of population. In many – but not all – contexts there is thus reason to refrain from even raising population issues. Also, when population is discussed, there should be a norm on doing so in a way that minimizes the risks.

## **The concept of vulnerability in the ageing population: technological innovations and ethical considerations**

**VIRGINIA SANCHINI<sup>1,2,3</sup> & ROBERTA SALA<sup>1</sup>**

<sup>1</sup> *Vita-Salute San Raffaele University*; <sup>2</sup> *Statale University of Milan*; <sup>3</sup> *Centre for Biomedical Ethics and Law, KU Leuven*

The phenomenon of a growing ageing population, which represents a major concern for advanced as well as developing countries worldwide, has raised a number of societal and normative challenges, prompting increased scholarly scrutiny from disciplines ranging from medical ethics to public health ethics. Together with more traditional questions investigating whether the elderly patient's 'right to an equal treatment' should be respected – or whether, on the contrary, potential exceptions to the application of the principle of justice for a vulnerable population could be morally justified (Gormally 1992; Hoose 1994) – two further sets of issues have emerged. Firstly, scholars have explored to what extent age-related value judgments take place, both overtly and at the undertow of medical decision-making, with the aim to assess the moral legitimacy of such practices and to advance proposals to turn the latter into more transparent and publicly accountable procedures (Ubachs-Moust et al. 2008). Secondly, drawing from concrete scenarios such as national courts' judgments and staff behavior in nursing homes, a second set of studies has dealt with normative issues concerning aging and non-dependent elderly people, investigating the conflict between a libertarian and a protectionist approach to healthcare delivery for elderly people (Sammet 2007). Building on this literature, this contribution aims to explore a still undertheorized issue: the connection between the traditional concept of vulnerability and innovation technologies for ageing, wondering to what extent new technologies for the elderly, in particular eHealth technologies and robotics, impacts on – and prompts towards a change of – the traditional concept of vulnerability.

## **“Who should raise children?” An anti-aggregative argument for licensing parents**

**RICCARDO SPOTORNO**

*Universitat Pompeu Fabra*

Should children be raised in families or should they be raised by public carers in public well-run orphanages? And if they are raised in families, should they be raised by their biological parents, or only by adults who have got a license that proves their parental competence, or, instead, should they be assigned to the best available prospective parents? This paper has three aims related to these questions. First, it shows that the state needs to reply to these

questions and to take consequent decisions in order to fulfil its duties towards children. Second, it provides a new framework to address these questions: the different child-assigning systems that the state can implement determine different unavoidable harms and risks of harm, or different levels of risk of harm, to children and adults. I specifically focus on the contrast between the Current System, according to which children are assigned by default to the legal custody of their biological parents, and Parental Licensing, according to which only adults who have got a license may parent a child. Third, it presents how different existing normative theories on the allocation of harms and risks answer to these questions and it shows that different anti-aggregative views support parental licensing. On the contrary, supporters of the Current System seem to be able to justify it only by appealing to implausible and counter-intuitive aggregative views.

## **Intentions and collateral damage**

**MATEJ SUŠNIK**

*Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb*

The aim of this paper is to examine the objection that there is no moral difference between terrorism and war. The force of this objection derives from the fact that the loss of innocent lives is an indispensable part of every war and that the harm done to civilians in military conflict usually far exceeds the harm caused by terrorist attacks. Unless one endorses pacifism or abandons the view that terrorism is never morally permissible, the challenge is to explain why killing civilians in the context of war may sometimes be justified. The common response to this challenge is provided by the doctrine of double effect (DDE). The advocates of the DDE believe that it matters morally whether certain harm is intentionally caused, or whether it merely occurs as a foreseen side effect (“collateral damage”). More specifically, they claim that in certain cases it could be morally permissible for an agent to perform an action that will have a harmful effect provided one does not intend to bring about that harm, but only foresees its unfortunate occurrence. While the DDE, as I will argue, does not adequately handle the above challenge, that does not yet imply that intentions are morally insignificant. The moral difference between war and terrorism still has its roots in intentions.

## **Accounting for the rights of the dead using an eternalist ontology**

**BRIAN WONG**

*University of Oxford*

Eternalism is an ontological view of time that posits that all existence in time is real and can be rendered into 'tenseless' truths: that is, it rejects the presentist view that only the present exists, or the growing block theory that argues that the future does not exist. This paper seeks to demonstrate that eternalism can resolve two of the most prominent critiques of the notion that the dead have rights: firstly, the charge that the dead no longer exist, and thus cannot be in possession of rights (the Non-existence Critique); secondly, the claim that the dead cannot interact with events that occur, and thus cannot be influenced or affected by any events after their death (the Non-Influence Critique). Eternalism resolves the former by offering a theoretical foundation to posit that the dead still exist after their deaths; it tackles the second charge by noting that to the extent an individual exists and possesses particular interests, the objective setback to these interests (independent of their subjective states) can be a morally relevant form of violation, and thus the dead do possess rights following on from the interests-centric account of rights. Individuals that 'exist' under eternalism can still be said to have a different moral status from individuals that exist in the present – this differentiation

mirrors the frequently drawn differentiation in literature concerning the ontology of time, that the present is granted certain psychological (and normative) priority over both the past and future, even if the present, past, and future are all real.